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Abstract 
Adding to the literature on intra-household bargaining in South Africa, this paper builds on the 
results obtained by Maitra and Ray (2003). They find that it matters who receives the income within 
the household as to how it is spent. This conclusion leads to a rejection of the unitary household 
model punted by case and Deaton (1998). This paper is in essence a replication study of Maitra and 
Ray's (2003) model and seeks to examine whether post-democracy 2006 data holds the same model 
of the household found in 1993. Thereafter, some sensible extensions are made to further analyse if 
differences can be found in spending behaviour of members of the same household. We find that 
the unitary household model can be rejected on the basis of different spending preferences between 
the sexes for conditional private transfers as well as unconditional grants such as the social pension. 
Additionally, and in contrast to Jensen (2003), Maitra and Ray hold that the crowding out of 
pensions is evident only amongst the poor and that pension income, in fact, complements transfers 
to wealthier elderly recipients. We do not find evidence of this disparity in transfer incentives in 
2006. We do find that, as poorer households are more likely to have poorer benefactors, the 
deciSion on whether to send remittances is influenced by the level of income that the household 
receives - transfer income decreasing for pension and other income whilst remittances rise for 
households that are considered poor. 
1 This study was made possible by a generous research scholarship from the DSTjNational Research Foundation: Chair in Poverty and 
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A Rand is a Rand or so case and Deaton found in their 1998 study on how pensions are 
spent. This means that a Rand of pension income is spent in the same manner as a rand of other 
income: income is pooled before it is spent. If Case and Deaton are correct then the government 
need not spend resources on identifying specific groups who require social support but rather grant 
a general public transfer to vulnerable households where these funds would lead to general 
improvement of living standards. More urgently, these targeted grants would only weakly support 
government policies at which they were aimed. In this model a grant aimed at providing resources 
to children specifically would be diluted by the use by other family members. 
If income pooling, and thus the unitary household model, held for South African households -
targeting grants would be unsuccessful. The child-support grant, for example, would be diluted by 
the size of the household (where in general household sizes increase as the incidence of poverty 
increases). Only a fraction of this income would therefore be spent on child goods and services and 
this fraction would decrease for poorer households. A cash grant on this baSiS, although theoretically 
speaking the most economically effiCient (case and Deaton, 1998), would require larger and larger 
\ amounts of money to realise the outcome of improved child welfare. 
But there are many ways to skin a cat - or in this case a buck. 
Other authors, such as Maitra and Ray, have found evidence which suggest that different types of 
income are spent on different goods and services in South African households. The targeted grants 
would therefore be achieving narrower goals than general household poverty alleviation if the 
money was to be spent on specific items of services which enabled the achievement of specific 
policy goals such as increased school attendance. These divergent views cause some trouble for 
policy analysis. 
Although it could well be argued that in poorer households general poverty alleviation is necessary 
to support specific goals such as improved school attendance we seek evidence that targeting of 
grants has a specific - not general - effect. This evidence could then be used to formulate policies 











South Africa does not offer a basic income grant to the poor but has adopted a number of grants 
that are targeted at vulnerable groups in order to achieve public policy goals such as the 
improvement of child nutrition. 
Do these targeted cash transfers produce the desired effect? 
This method of targeted transfers has come under scrutiny by organizations such as the World Bank 
because of the lack of reinforcement of social structures and supportive social spending (van de 
Walle, 1998). For example, policies to reduce poverty would have to be multi-faceted in that free 
basic services would be coupled with these targeted grants. There is as yet no one-size-fits-all 
approach to how best to structure these grants. Broadly targeted social sector spending coupled 
with narrowly targeted in-kind grants has been suggested on the one hand (van de Walle, 1998) 
whilst broad cash transfers have been punted on the other (Case and Deaton, 1998). Conditional 
public transfers have been lauded as achieving the desired social outcomes where public grants are 
paid on the basis that certain actions are taken or criteria met in programs such as PROGRESSA, 
Mexico (Gonzalez-Robledo and Nigenda, 2005). The concern of the multinational and public 
institutions is how to ensure that these grants are spent on items which contribute to the 
improvement of specific development goals such as child morbidity or literacy rates. It would be 
generally accepted that any rise in income would lead to an increase in living standards. 
The first step in achieving efficient and effectively targeted grants is to gain a greater understanding 
of how households spend their grants. In this study we will be able to distinguish between how 
households spend unconditional, indexed grants such as the SOCial pension and how they spend 
conditional private transfers2• 
Rejecting the unitary household model would give support to the belief that these grants 
would reach the targeted groups in a manner which increased their welfare. We do not just look for 
different patterns of spending between income flows but also the types of goods that public and 
private transfers are spent on. 
2 See Cox's 1987 paper "Motives for private income transfers" for the exchange theorem where the transfer sender is 
dominant as well as Cox and Jimenez (1990) on "Achieving social objectives through private transfers"; Willis and Lillard 
(1997) on "Motives for intergenerational transfers" and Guth et al (2002) on the crowding out of private transfers for 
discussions on conditional intergenerational transfers. In these transfers are given in expectation of the retum of 












In this short paper one would be hard pressed to rigorously examine every angle of the relationship 
between income and expenditure. We anchor our analysis on the replication of Maitra and Ray's 
system of equations to see whether the key intra-household bargaining results still hold. 
We attempt to answer the following questions: 
i. Are the expenditure patterns discovered by Maitra and Ray in the SALDRU 1993 data 
apparent in the 2005 IES data? 
ii. Do pensions crowd out transfers for the poor but compliment transfers to the wealthy as 
Maitra and Ray find? 
iii. Do these results vary when the variables and processes the authors used are altered? 
Thereafter we make some sensible extensions to their model to allow a more in-depth look at 
expenditure decisions within the household. This is accomplished through the disaggregation of 
pension and transfer income by gender following a later paper by Maitra and Ray (2000). We would 
be able to identify with this analysis not only differences between spending of the three income 
sources but also within each source by males versus females. This is refined even further by dividing 
transfer incomes into age categories as well as genders. We can thus differentiate between how 
transfers to children are spent in comparison to adults and the elderly. This last breakdown can also 
help us to pinpoint if pension incomes crowd out transfers to the elderly or rather to all household 
members. Lastly we check the sensitivity of results to the race and poverty as well as testing the 
appropriateness of the adult equivalence scale that Maitra and Ray derived. It is important for us to 
know how robust our findings are to variable inclusions and different definitions of variables. 
Thus, we are able to ascertain whether there have been changes in household decision-
making over the last fifteen years and also how sensitive the conclusions are to the speCifics of the 
chosen methodology. 
We find that the unitary household model with income pooling can be rejected not only on the basiS 
of different expenditure patterns for transfer recipients - whose choice of spending we feel may be 
limited by the probable conditionality of the remittance - but also between male and female pension 
recipients. The findings by Duflo (2000) that female pensioners spend on child items whilst male 











Our results concerning the crowding out of private transfers by pensions holds in genelCll as in 
Jensen (2003) and diverges from Maitra and Ray's conclusion that pension income crowds out 
transfers for the poor but complements transfers for the well off. 
Additionally, we find that the strength of our results are sensitive to the definitions of our 
explanatory variables which leads us to caution policy makers not to attach particular significance to 
a specific outcome but ICIther to use the ovelCllI picture of our analysis to indicate that conditional 
grants induce changes in behaviour (Hoddinott, 2008) and that blanket cash grants that 
disproportionately reach women alleviate the poverty of children as well as Case and Deaton (1998) 
found. 
2. A short theoretical introduction to the unitary household model 
In order to make a decision on the presence of a unitary household structure in the data we should 
briefly outline the theoretical constitution of the null model. 
From Maitra and Ray (2003) the welfare function takes the form of: 
W = W [ {US ( X' () . E )}S }} 5=1 subject to p'X = l.~=l/s (i) 
Where the utility of each household member US depends on the consumption on the whole 
household x = Xis and s represents the individual and i the commodity. This welfare is constrained 
by the ratio of household income Is to the number of goods X by price vector p. The demand 
function portraying the unitary household model where incomes are pooled is given as 
(ii) 
When optimised either through the bargaining models (see Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and 
Horney, 1981) or the collective approach to optimisation of welfare (See Chiappori) the distribution 
of income matters in the optimisation of welfare. 
(iii) 
This theoretical basiS shows us what we are looking for in our results. In order to reject the unitary 











the income I in terms of how this income is spent (as in equation iii). If we find a pattern where 
earned income and pension income are spent on significantly different items we would conclude that 
as these incomes generally accrue to different members of the household - income to adults and 
pensions to the elderly - income is not pooled within the household. Rather, it matters who receives 
the income as to how it will be spent. 
If income pooling is found then one can conclude that the household makes unified 
expenditure decisions. The household therefore acts as a single demand unit in the view of an 
economist. If rejected then economists would consider the intra-household bargaining behaviour 
concerning how resources are spent. 
3. Our Model 
Maitra and Ray disprove the existence of income pooling behaviour in apartheid South Africa - using 
the same data that Case and Deaton used although their model deviates from Case and Deaton's 
(1998) considerably. The Maitra and Ray model disaggregates transfers further than Case and 
Deaton did in their study (1998) into SOCial pensions and private transfers. Maitra and Ray do not 
provide reasoning for this change but this paper shall interpret the effects of social pensions as 
unconditional grants and private transfers as conditional grants. Income flows now include SOCial 
pensions (P), private transfers (T) and other income (Y). Maitra and Ray present all their data at the 
household level as well as including dependence between these variables. 
That Maitra and Ray come to different conclusions to case and Deaton is worrying. As outlined 
before, South Africa has an extensive grant system and ineffiCient targeting implies that SOCial 
moneys may not make their way to needy citizens for specific items. Further empirical investigation 
of the unitary household model is therefore important. This is especially so because of the 
drawbacks of the Maitra and Ray analysis outlined below. 
Maitra and Ray's approach shows improvements on Case and Deaton's in that the authors can make 
a more precise argument in favour or against income pooling by allowing for the different effects of 











an indicator basis - such as pensions being awarded to those who qualify in terms of age and 
income eligibility - private transfers are very likely to be sent conditionally. Transfers to the 
caregiver of children are likely to be conditional on their being spent on child items such as 
education. If spent on, for example alcohol, the remittances would most likely cease3. We should 
therefore be very careful in examining the expenditure decisions surrounding private transfers as 
these could already have "been made" either through the conditionality mentioned above or else 
through transfers in kind. It is useful, therefore to separate between these transfers. 
We go further in disaggregating our data to see whether transfers received by men and 
women are spent differently - as is the general finding in previous studies (Duflo, 2000). Also, we 
look at whether different age groups indicate different patterns of spending. This disaggregation 
forms the core of our analysis. We seek to obtain as intricate a picture of household spending 
patterns as possible with the data and model at hand. 
On the other hand, Maitra and Ray's reasoning behind making the income flows endogenous is 
flawed as their argument describes a time dependent process. This study is run in a static 
environment where the amount of income received is not a sequential decision by the household 
itself. 
Maitra and Ray justify the inclusion of this endogenous string of equations by an income decision 
argument. They hold that a household, with the full knowledge that state pension income is means 
tested, makes a deCision as to how much income it should be earned in order to maximize utility, 
that is, maximize household income whilst minimizing household work effort. The more income a 
household member earns (over a certain threshold) the lower their social pension income. 
Thereafter pension income is received on the basis of this household income. Further, household 
members then make a decision to remain or migrate dependent on the income hitherto determined 
- if household income and social pension incomes are high enough to sustain the household then 
migration for work might not be necessary. If not, these members may migrate for work and the 
household is sometimes further supported in the form of private transfers from these members. 
This argument does not seem convincing in a statiC environment. This outcome seems more 
likely in a time series or panel study where individuals chose income knowing the effect on pension 
3 Although there may well be an expectation on the side of a poorer family member to receive transfers from wealthier 
members in this study we assume that private transfers are sent for a specific purpose by benefactors in a similar social 











and transfers later in life or a migration decision can be made in time t+ 1. We can adapt this 
argument in order to maintain the structure of the flow variable being absorbed into the model. We 
can say that pension income is dependent on lifetime income of that individual - a good proxy for 
which is the income levels of the entire household. The amount sent in private transfers is likely to 
depend on the level of non-transfer income because the sender would have a similar income 
structure to that of the receiving household (especially if the transfers are familial). An extended 
family member would more likely send money to poorer family members than to those better off. 
In general, however, this endogenous income flow model can be justified through this more intuitive 
argument and the model rigorously checked for interdependence so assure the reader that the 
results of this study are not biased. 
Maitra and Ray leave their work open to critiCism by analysing the model over all races and 
comparing the outcomes to Case and Deaton's work (1998) which considered only black and white 
households - and these separately. They do attempt to take into account race effects by including 
race dummy variables. This manner of inclusion assumes that the preference of different races differ 
only by a shift factor. This is difficult to justify, especially in 1993 when incomes as well as 
expenditure options were restricted by race. In our study we internalise this drawback by running 
the model separately for each race to check for large disparities in results to check the sensitivity of 
the results to this decision. 
Additionally, we establish whether the results are sensitive to Maitra and Ray's choice of adult 
equivalence scales and poverty line. The choice equivalence scales seem counter intuitive with 
weights for children being calculated as greater than those for adults. We check whether our results 
are robust for a more generally accepted scale. In the same way the poverty line chosen by Maitra 
and Ray seems quite arbitrary and therefore checking to what extent our results change when this 
poverty line changes would make the interpretation of the model more certain. 
Lastly, and most importantly, it must be noted that the Maitra and Ray conclUSion that private 
transfers to a household are spent differently to other incomes and public grants such as the social 











Africa are indicator based and as such are (as they find) spent in much the same manner as other 
incomes. Private transfers on the other hand would most likely be conditional or at least partially so. 
The individuals sending these transfers would generally have a specific end in mind for these funds 
(an issue which Maitra and Ray touch upon but do not take further). These flows are therefore much 
more likely in general to have "predetermined outcomes" than a public indicator based grant as are 
transfers sent in kind which are included in this data. 
We note that Maitra and Ray find that pension income crowds out private transfers for poor 
households but complements transfers for wealthier households. An outcome not too unexpected for 
1993 data when one considers that poor households receiving pensions would most likely have had 
poor benefactors and wealthier recipients, wealthier benefactors4• If transfers were sent by a 
migrant worker to the caregiver of their children then this amount would almost certainly be based 
on the difference in income between the giver and receiver. The private transfer is therefore based 
on a remittance decision where pension income arrives - the extended household re-optimises and 
the transfers thereafter continue or stop. There is ample literature on the crowding out effects of the 
social pension (see for example Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994). Jensen (2003) examines this 
question in much detail, for South Africa in particular, and finds that crowding out is a robust 
outcome over all levels of income. Noticeably, whereas Maitra and Ray draw the conclusion that 
social pensions therefore entrench poverty, we claim that the redistributive qualities of the pension 
extend to the remittance senders as well. If the state can support the poor and vulnerable, then the 
pressure of familial support would lift off the shoulders of possibly equally poor transfer senders. 
In our analysis we examine the relationship between instrumental variables and endogenous income 
flows which would tell the researcher whether increases in pension income leads to decreases in 
transfers, that is to crowding out. And secondly, we examine the pattems of expenditure produced 
by each income flow variable. We look to see if earned income, for example, is spent on the same 
items as pension income which would indicate income pooling. 
4See for example Schoenei's 1993 paper ""Private interhousehold transfers of money and time: new empirical 
evidence". Wealthier households would likely have more disposable income to transfer. The marginal cost of private 
transfers for poorer households would be higher as their disposable income is likely to be low (autonomous 












We divide our study into three parts: the replication of the Maitra and Ray model on 2006 IES data, 
the further disaggregation of income flows into gender and age categories and lastly the sensitivity 
checks described above. 
Maitra and Ray's endogenous income flow equations are constructed as follows: 
Yh _ f (h h h ()h) h - 1 Z1' e1 ,c1 , 1 + U 1 (iv) 
Ph - f (yh h h h ()h) + h - 2 , Z2 ,e2 ,c2 , 2 U 2 (v) 
R h - f (yh ph h h h eh) h - 3 "Z3 ,e3 ,c3 , 3 + U 3 (vi) 
h _ F (yh ph Rh h h h eh) + h Wi - 14 ",Z4 ,e4 ,c4 , 4 U4 i=l, ... ,n (vii) 
For comparability we maintain Maitra and Ray format where wt indicates the budget share of item i 
in household h such that the sum of budget shares for each household adds up to 1. The left hand-
side variables comprise demographic and educational (z), asset (c) and regional (e) characteristics 
respectively. The parameters 81-4 were estimated by Maitra and Ray through the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the equations iv-vii and used to create an adult equivalence scale to weight the 
variables entering this system of equations. The total adult equivalent monthly expenditures of each 
household are divided into 11 budget shares of which 10 or n-1 are estimated by 3SLS. These share 
categories are food; alcohol and tobacco; entertainment; health; education; fuel; clothing; childcare; 
food eaten outside the home; remittances sent; and other goods. The right hand-side variables 
include household levels of social pension income (P), private transfer income (R) and all other 
income (Y). 
Other household income (yh) is therefore dependent on household characteristics, household 
pension income (ph) is dependent on these characteristics as well as household income and finally 
the private transfers households receive (Rh) is dependent on household characteristics, household 
income as well as the level of social pension income. 
The budget shares are functions of the above three equations as well as the characteristics 











After the replication of this basic model of household dynamics we follow Maitra and Ray (2000) by 
digging deeper into the income flow equations by dividing pension and transfer income into gender 
categories. The model is thus adapted to: 
Yh _ t (h h h eh) + h - 1 Zl I e1 I C1 I 1 U 1 (viii) 
Ph - f (yh h h h eh) h - 2 I Z2 I e2 I C2 I 2 + U2 (ix) 
Rh - f (yh ph h h h eh) h 9 - 3 I I Z3 I e3 I C3 I 3 + U 3 (x) 
i=l, ... ,n (xi) 
Where the index g indicates the disaggregation of pension and transfer income into male and female 
income flows. We do not extend this disaggregation to other kinds of income - which would create 
bias in the results if there is an unobserved selection decision into the workforce, such as an 
educated mother's decision to remain at home to look after her children instead of working for a 
competitive salary. 
We extend this framework to child, adult and elderly transfer income where these age categories are 
more likely to impact on Significantly different expenditure shares such as transfers to children being 
spent on child items. This additional model is configured as: 
Yh _ f (h h h eh) h - 1 Zl I e1 I C1 I 1 + U 1 (xii) 
Ph - f (yh h It h eh) + h - 2 I Z2 I e2 I C2 I 2 U 2 (xiii) 
Rit - f (ylt ph h It h eh) h ga - 3 I I Z3 I e3 I C3 I 3 + U 3 (xiv) 











where a indexes the age category of the transfer beneficiary. These categories include children 
between 0 and 19 years; adults over 20 years and up to the elderly cohort which ranges from 60 for 
females and 65 for males upwards. 
4. Data 
The Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) 2005/06 data comprise 24 000 dwelling units with 22617 
household surveys realised over twelve months between September 2005 and August 2006. All 
dwelling units were eligible for data collection except institutions such as old-age homes, hospitals 
and dormitories for scholars. The interview was split and conducted in five separate visits over a 
month. Two instruments were used for collection of household data; the one being a general 
household questionnaire and the other being a diary in which households were required to record all 
acquisitions for the survey month. 
Following Maitra and Ray we omit all households that are headed by a child (where children are 
members of up to 19 years of age in contrast to Maitra and Ray's 17 years) or that have zero 
household income. Further, for quality purposes, we omit all households with zero food expenditure 
(which includes food in-kind), households which do not fall into the four prescribed race categories, 
households with missing weights or missing age information for the household head. The subsample 
on which this analysis is run includes 18 126 households. 
It would be interesting to note in what areas of the data the 1993 SALDRU and 1996 IES data sets 
have marked differences, such as large changes in household composition and incomes by race, for 
instance. A collection of sample statistics have been put together to facilitate this comparison. There 
are some differences across the years: the differences between households which receive transfers 
and those who do not are more pronounced, the differences being statistically significant across all 
relevant variables in 2006. 
Statistical differences between pension recipient households and non-recipients are 











In order to define the variables as closely as possible to those used by Maitra and Ray it was 
necessary to refer to the SALDRU 1993 dataset as well as to keep in mind the purpose of variables. 
Areas where it was necessary for the researcher to use her discretion in creating variables which 
matched those in the Maitra and Ray analysis are discussed below. 
The expenditure values in particular were grouped from items recorded in different 
instruments in the survey. For example, the childcare expenditure category included such items as 
"nanny employment" and "baby food". The former is an expense recorded in the main questionnaire 
as an estimate of the annual expenditure on nanny services employed. The latter is recorded in the 
diary that the households were expected to fill in concerning daily expenditures. The researcher 
judged that for expenditures such as food items, for which there was no record in the main 
questionnaire, the inflatedS annual sum of these items should be included in the expenditure share 
category - these included food and alcohol and tobacco. 
For categories where there was no record in the diary the inflated annual sum of the main 
questionnaire value should be included in the expenditure category. Lastly, where the category was 
made up of a mix of items - items with values in both the main questionnaire and diary would 
reflect the sum of the inflated annualized values for the main questionnaire would be used whilst 
single value items would be treated as above. The justification for this decision lies in the irregularity 
of the make-up of baskets of goods purchased. Items such as detergent might be purchased 3 or 4 
times a year but be present in the diary in which case the annual estimated expenditure for this item 
would better reflect expenditure patterns. Each expenditure category included cash as well as in-
kind goods as did the income categories. 
Although they did not explicitly define how they categorised unemployment, Maitra and Ray 
interpreted the dummy for having an unemployed adult in the household as a leakage of resources 
caused by a member who was not contributing to the household expenses. Also, an unemployed 
person was more likely to draw in remittances from members outside the household. In this case, 
because we had to use our discretion when defining the unemployment category, we constructed a 
variable which indicated that an adult was present in the household which drew on resources but did 
not contribute to resources (through such funds as the disability or unemployment insurance) except 
through moneys received as remittances. 
5 Inflated to September 2006 (the last month that the IES was gathered). These values are an option in the data 
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This was further made necessary by the lack of indication of unemployment in the IES 2005/6 data. 
Here, reasons for having missing income data were not provided which made it difficult to make a 
judgment call on whether to label the adult individual as unemployed or to impute earnings. We 
compared a number of unemployment variables in order to choose the most balanced definition and, 
as it happened, the unemployment dummy constructed by the labour definition perfectly matched 
that of our variable of "unemployment leakages,l6. 
The age variable was presented in 5-year age brackets in the IES data to further ensure the 
anonymity of respondents. These brackets could be included in different ways, for example as a 
linear ordinal variable or dummies for each bracket. Another method - which creates a trade-off 
between bias in the variable and the retention of the quadratic nature of the age variable in Maitra 
and Ray's analysis - is to set the age at the median of the bracket. Although the ordinal and bracket 
median ages would be interpreted similarly for the linear age variable, the quadratic would require 
this last definition of median age and median age squared. This is how the researcher chose to 
include the age of the household head in the replication study. Sensitivity checks were performed in 
order to evaluate how robust the results were to the different methods of incorporating this variable 
into the mode\. 
The adult equivalence scales are described below. This is a different method to the commonly used 
per capita scales. Children are generally given a lower weighting to adult consumption and income 
as children can be assumed, for example, to consume less food than adults. Maitra and Ray find 
child weights to be generally greater than adult weights. This type of weighting allows the results to 
be interpreted free of economies of scale in the household. Economies of scale assume that costs 
increase at a decreasing rate for larger households. For example, a single person would need to rent 
a house with a kitchen, bathroom and bedroom whilst two people would need just one extra 
bedroom and could share the rest of the house. The marginal cost of having an extra person in the 
house decreases as the household gets bigger. Maitra and Ray estimate the weights of the different 
members of the household with the maximum likelihood method on equations iv-vii (see Maitra & 
Ray, 2003 p. 31). The equation for the adult equivalence scale is: 
(xvi) 
6 This variable is only present in the right hand-side of the R or private transfers equation. This Maitra and Ray find 











where for na is the number of adults and for no the number of elderly in a household. The weights 
8ds of children aged d with gender s are presented as nds. These brackets are divided as 0-4 years 
and 5-19 years (this last term sums the respective child weights times the number of children in 
each group). The household economies of scale "a" were estimated through the above mentioned 
MLE as 0.656. The weights of adults are one whilst the weights found by Maitra and Ray are: 
Weights by age and gender 
Age Group 
Gender o to 4 years 5 to 19 years adult elderly 
female 1.091 1.344 1 1 
male 0.939 1.126 1 1 
For the poverty line Maitra and Ray use the per adult equivalence scale to weight the line using the 
same parameters as above but with the average number of children and adults per household in 
the data set (the average number of each group in the dataset appearing with the additionl 
subscript "ave_". 
These results are not in line with other literature. It is generally assumed that children are weighted 
under adults. Maitra and Ray's weights for children thus suggest that in general consumption and 
income for children is higher than for adults. We feel it necessary to test the sensitivity of any 
results we find to a more traditional version of this scale. 
Maitra and Ray used carter and May's (1999) poverty line of R237 for 1993. As we inflated out 
expenditures to September 2006 we made use of the Statistics South Africa data (available at 
www.statssa.gov.za) for inflation between September 1993 and 2006 which resulted in an inflation 
rate of 1.424649. The Poverty line is thus set at R574.64 per adult equivalent per month. The adult 
equivalent weighted household income y* is then compared to the average adult equivalent 
weighted poverty line. 
The household is considered poor if y*spoverty line. 











5. Replication results 
Maitra and Ray draw some interesting and intuitive conclusions from their analysis. The more 
general of these are the confirmation of Engel's law which says that the proportion of income spent 
on basic items such as food and fuel decreases as income increases. They also find that increases in 
household size decrease adult equivalent weighted income - there being negative signs of the 
coeffiCients for numbers of household members for the income equation which are found to be 
significant at the 95% significance level as the p-value is lower than 0.05. There is a positive impact 
of education on earnings where higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of 
earnings. This relationship is weaker for black households which can be seen by the negative sign 
on the interaction term between the maximum level of education attained in the household and the 
dummy for black households. This Maitra and Ray ascribe to the legacy of apartheid. 
Other regular outcomes are the gender income gap - males on average receiving less the females 
whilst controlling for education and other characteristics. This gap is only seen in the gender of the 
household head variable owing to the household level of analysis. In agreement with Case and 
Deaton (1998) are Maitra and Ray's findings that the variables most influencing pension receipt are 
demographic rather than income effects. 
More interesting are Maitra and Ray's findings that crowding out of private transfers by pension 
income is apparent for the poor but that pension income complements transfer income for the non-
poor. This is evident in the negative sign of the interaction term between poverty and transfers as 
well as the impact of race on private transfers. They claim that the poor could be left even worse off 
if the size of transfers were greater than those of the public pension. This is disputable in that 
transfers to poor families from other family members most likely have their sources in other 
relatively poor households. These funds would necessarily have reduced the living standards of the 
giving household (possibly moving that household into poverty) and almost certainly been an 
inconsistent grant. PenSion payments on the other hand would not be subject to household shocks 
(such as the giving member becoming unemployed) and is a sustainable, exogenous and conSistent 
injection into the poor communities. They also conclusively find that an increase in private transfers 










With regards to the budget share equations Maitra and Ray find that private transfers and not 
pensions act on certain budget shares such as food, education and childcare. This is consistent with 
the theory that transfers flow to poorer members of the household or to the caregivers of children, 
often from migrant labour (Jensen, 2003). Income and transfers also act in opposite directions, that 
is - the coefficients have opposite signs, on some shares such as food with income reducing and 
transfers increasing the proportion of the budget spent on this category. They claim that this is 
evidence that transfer and non-transfer income are not spent in the same way because expenditure 
patterns differ for these three income sources. They conclude that the most apparent reason for 
these patterns is that it matters who receives the transfer. They claim there is a bearing as to who 
has control over the money. It is difficult to see how this could work in the traditional households of 
the pre-apartheid era. A transfer sent by a working mother to her children would be controlled by 
their guardian or the head of the household where they live. Also, the patriarchal make-up of the 
African household in particular would indicate the control of resources by men if present (Edmonds 
et aI., 2003). They do caution that this could be partly owing to the inclusion of "in-kind" income 
and expense in the analysis (as this would severely limit the chosen spending behaviour of the 
subjects). We doubly caution the reader that when transfers are sent for a specific purpose 
recipients are constrained in their spending as discussed in previous sections. An effective means of 
examining this would be to further break down the categories of income flows into gender and age 
specific brackets. 
Our own replication was performed using variables as closely aligned to Maitra and Ray's as possible 
to ensure maximum comparability. These variables and their definitions are presented in the data 
section. These results can be found in appendix 1. We ran the three staged least squares (3SLS) 
procedure on equations iv-vii and found that the Kleibergen and Paap (K-P) statisticl for the three 
endogenous flow variables was significant for their instruments. We can thus reject the null 
hypothesis of weak instruments. Additionally, a Wu-Hausman test was performed on the model and 
the null of efficient estimates under ordinary least squares (OLS) was rejected leading us to 
conclude that the 3SLS procedure produces unbiased and more efficient results. 
7 The Cragg-Donald statistic is suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) to test the strength of multiple instruments on multiple equations in a 
homoscedastic environment. In order to make our result more robust we prefer the Kleibergen and Paap statistic as this controls for 
heteroscedastisity where the C-D statistic is a special case of the K-P statistic under the homoscedasticity assumption. This conclusion 





















Number of children 
Number of adults 
































dummy=1 if the total household income falls below the adult equivalent poverty line and zero otherwise 
per adult equivalent monthly private transfer income which includes only money and the market value of goods 
sent in-kind to the household as unconditional remittances so no legal binding such as alimony or disability 
grants 
per adult equivalent monthly public social pension income for the age eligible with a five-year error interval for 
age heaping (females aged 55 and males aged 60 and above) 




Number of household members aged between 0 and 19 years 
Number of household members aged between 20 and 59 years for women and 20 to 64 for men 
N um ber of household mem bers aged 60 and over for females and 65 and over for males 
dummy=1 if the head of the household is a penSioner who receives a social pension and is age eligible with the 
five-year error interval and zero otherwise 
The age of the household head pegged at the median of the age bracket 
(AGEHEAD)2 
dummy=1 if the head of the household is male and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head has no education and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head has some primary school education and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head has completed primary school and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head has completed high school and zero otherwise 
The highest level of education attained by a member of the household 
dummy=1 if the household lives in a rural area and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head is Black and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head is Coloured and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head is Indian and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household head is White and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if there is an unemployed adults in the household and zero otherwise 
Type of toilet available (more formal types are assigned lower numbers - ordinal) 
dummy=1 if the household owns a car and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household owns a radio and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if the household owns a fridge and zero otherwise 








Social penSion income by gender 9 
Private transfer income by gender 9 











Let us first examine the areas in which our model supports the finding of Maitra and Ray. The 
impact of the household composition on income and pension flows adheres to our a priori 
expectations that households with more members tend to have lower levels of income on average 
(Edmonds et aI., 2003). The age variables perform quite well in giving significant coefficients with 
the expected signs. These suggest that household income increases at a decreasing rate for the age 
of the household head - a common finding. Pension incomes react by increasing for higher 
household head ages which relates the age eligibility criterion for social pension receipt. The 
education dummies generally follow the signs of their Maitra and Ray associates although the logic 
of these signs may be questioned: income decreasing on average when education is gained by the 
household head (over the base category of no education) whilst pension and transfer income 
increases over the same variables. This result is augmented for black households in that the 
interaction term between the maximum level of education and poverty in a household decreases 
income for this subsample. The race dummies agree with Maitra and Ray in that income for black 
households is on average higher than their white counterparts whilst for Indian and coloured 
households these coefficients are negative. White households also receive more transfers than other 
households which is consistent with the base results. Lastly, the asset variables generally indicate 
that higher levels of income afford these non-durables8 • As Maitra and Ray found, transfers decrease 
significantly for poor households receiving pensions and other income. 
A generally different pattern emerges with regard to transfers in our data. The marked differences 
are that transfers increase for the number of children and decrease for the number of adults in a 
household which is contrary to Maitra and Ray's findings. Also, there is a reversal for the sign on the 
unemployment dummy - transfers now decrease for the presence of an unemployed adult in the 
household. These two outcomes point towards a different set of incentives for remittance sending. 
In the SALDRU 1993 data higher numbers of adults or unemployed drew in more transfers whilst in 
2006 children seems to draw in transfers. We could surmise that transfers for unemployment could 
8 The inclusion of an asset index on the right hand side of income can be argued to be counter-intuitive as there is 
certainly a relationship between these but it is rather the level of income which impacts on the ownership of non-
durables rather than the other way around. Also, the choice of these specific assets is up to debate as the ownership is a 
result of location as well as income, rural areas being restricted even in 2006 to little or no electricity for fridges. Their 











be crowded out by public unemployment grants while the support of children by their working family 
members has increased. The make-up of the African household offers a suggestion to why this 
might be. Migrant labour and traditional household dynamics indicate that migrant parents would 
send remittances home to the child-minder to cover the costs of this exercise (Ouflo, 2000; 
Edmonds et aI., 2003). The Pension still seems to hinder transfers - even more so because of the 
direct negative effect of pensions as well as the number of elderly in the household, neither of which 
was significant in Maitra and Ray analysis. Maitra and Ray conclusion of crowding out of transfers by 
pensions was based on the interaction between poverty and pension income. They conclude that 
pensions crowd out transfers for poor households but are complements for wealthier households. In 
2006 we can see that this has changes track and that any other incomes crowd out transfers 
(pension and other income result in decreases of transfer income) - but more especially for the poor 
(negative impact of the interaction between poverty and pension on transfer income). This is in line 
with Jensen's (2003) findings that the crowding out of transfers by pensions holds generally. Our 
results do not corroborate Maitra and Rays' findings that for the non-poor, pension income 
compliments private transfers. We find that SOCial pension income crowds out private transfers. 
In accordance with Maitra and Ray, the budget share equations indicate that Engel's law of 
decreasing basic goods shares in total expenditure as income (Y) increases does indeed hold in the 
South African data, although not as clearly as Maitra and Ray find. Here expenditures on food 
decreases and expenditures on non-basic items such as entertainment and clothing increases as 
income increases. A greater number of adults in the household increases expenditure on adult goods 
such as alcohol and tobacco. Expenditures on basiC items also increases for lower levels of education 
attained by the households head and is higher for male headed and rural households. The 
expenditure patterns for the different races also mimic those found by Maitra and Ray. 
The impacts of household size are different to those that are found by Maitra and Ray. They 
find that increases in household size generally decrease expenditure on basiCS whereas our analysis 
shows the opposite. This is a more expected outcome considering that poorer households are 
generally larger than wealthier ones and as the poor are expected to spend a greater proportion of 
their budget on basic items such as food (Edmonds et ai, 2003). 
The similarity of the impact of the other variables on the budget share equations convinces 
us that if differences are found in our results these are almost entirely to do with the income pooling 











of the coefficients show that income and transfers act in the opposite direction for food 
expenditures. This is not a surprising outcome poor households are almost twice as likely to receive 
transfers as non-poor households and, by Engel's law, this would naturally increase basic 
expenditures. This is further supported by the negative sign of the interaction term between poverty 
and transfers on basic expenditure shares. Also, as mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, 
private transfers could be generally assumed to be conditional on the ongoing consumption of goods 
for which the transfer is intended. Interestingly, and in support of our earlier claim that transfers are 
seen to be more directed at the upbringing of children than at poorer or unemployed family member 
support, transfer expenditure on education is positive and significant. The food and alcohol and 
tobacco shares work in oppOSite directions for transfers and income whereas the entertainment 
shares move together. 
This is not as clear cut a result as Maitra and Ray find. Their analysiS holds that the three budget 
shares move in opposing directions whilst no shares move together significantly for the different 
income flows. They can therefore reject the hypothesis that different incomes are spent the same 
way. Although this author is not convinced that three shares are sufficient to reject the hypotheSiS of 
income pooling, our results we find do not provide the proof needed to make this claim. Apart from 
food and alcohol and tobacco expenditures the income and pension flows seem to be spent in the 
same manner in both our analyses as well as Maitra and Ray's. 
We again alert the reader to the possible impact of conditionality of funds on how they are 
spent. If conditional transfers are spent differently to earned and unconditional transfer income this 
should point towards the conclusion that if the household were allowed to choose how their money 
is spent then a rand of grant income would be spent the same way as any other income. At this 
point we do not find sufficient evidence to reject the unitary household model of income pooling. We 
are also cautious in accepting this model as much literature describes the differences in spending 
behaviour between men and women of unconditional public grants such as the pension (see Duflo, 
2000 for a discussion on the impact of female pension income). If we found that men and women 
spent their income differently without a conditionality clause then we would be able to reject the 
hypothesis of income pooling. It would matter who (in terms of gender) received the income as to 











6. Extension Results 
6.1 Disaggregation by gender 
A sensible extension to our model would be to separate our income flow variables by gender based 
on the evidence of different spending preferences gathered by Duflo (2000). In order to reveal these 
relationships in our framework it would be useful to follow Maitra and Ray's 2000 paper "Intra 
Household Resource Allocation And Their Impact On Expenditure Patterns: Comparative Evidence 
From South Africa And Pakistan" which perform this exact disaggregation by gender, except for the 
division of earned income. This diviSion is reliant on subtle, and often unobserved, decisions such as 
the election of a woman to work when she has small children that there is a real possibility of 
introducing selection bias into our estimation. We therefore run a 3SLS analysiS on equations viii-xi, 
or results are available in appendix 2. Again we reject the null of weak instruments by the robust K-
P statistic as well as rejecting the efficient use of OLS by the Wu-Hausman test. 
Our gender disaggregation results both agree and disagree with those obtained by Maitra and Ray in 
much the same way as our replication analYSis. The instrumental impact on the flow variables are 
conSistent with our earlier findings except in a few important aspects. The transfer income for the 
household decreased for an additional elderly person in both our replication as well as Maitra and 
Ray's study. In these results, however, there is a reversal of signs for the presence of female elderly 
persons in the household - an outcome consistent with the literature that elderly female household 
heads often care for children (see for example case and Deaton, 1998; Duflo, 2000; Edmonds et aI., 
2003). This is also consistent with our own observation that transfers in 2006 are largely directed at 
children. We can see that transfers that flow to the elderly are also captured by the sex of the 
household head variables with signs conflicting on these variables for transfer income. Again it can 
be seen that transfers are crowded out by pension income for all incomes but most especially for the 
poor. In general the differences in the size of income between females of each race are smaller than 
the differences for males between races. 
In terms of the impact of these disaggregated flows on budget shares we find that, as is 
consistent with the family model of a female Child-carer, transfer income to females have a positive 











of transfers received by each household head gender is almost evenly divided). Transfers to men 
increase spending on clothing and fuel whereas spending on these items decreases for women 
receiving transfers. We can also see that there is a suggestion that pension income is spent 
differently by men and women as opposite signs are found for males and females on clothing, 
childcare and food eaten outside the home budget shares. The significant coefficients still generally 
hold Engel's law of increasing basic spending of lower income groups. 
The expenditure on child items by women receiving transfers is consistent with the literature 
and there is also evidence here to support the argument that pension income alleviates child poverty 
(Case & Deaton, 1998; Duflo, 2000) in that pension income for females increases expenditure on 
childcare relative to the shares received by men. 
We are interested in the divergence of spending between genders within the transfer flows which 
would give us a better understanding of intra-household bargaining. We again caution that transfer 
spending may well be conditional and as such all conclusions surrounding this flow should be met 
with caution. The divergence of spending patterns in the pension income - and especially the 
increase in child-item expenditure owing to higher female pension income does indeed point towards 
a non-unitary model. We can conclude that conditional as well as unconditional transfers are spent 
differently by women and men. This means that the household does not seem to function as a 
single unit, men and women making statistically significant different expenditure choices. Therefore, 
the unitary household model with income pooling can be rejected at this stage of analysis. 
6.2 Disaggregation by gender and age 
We do note that our analysis paints to a distinction between adult and child expenditures as well as 
expenditures separated by gender. We pursue our course and divide our transfer income further into 
child, adult and elderly groups, our results are available in appendix 3. We encounter a problem in 
this analysis owing to the small amount of money sent as transfers - these small amounts do not 
impact on the budget shares because of their size. The fineness of the transfer flow variables 











We continue with our analysis of this model for the single reason that the impact of the 
instruments on the flow variables are so interesting to interpret. We find that our coefficients on the 
variables for the income and pension equations are largely the same as before with our coefficients 
varying towards the Maitra and Ray results as our replication study does. The interpretation of our 
transfer equation, however, indicates that whilst male pensions crowd out transfers this is not 
necessarily the case for female pensions. This is consistent with our understanding of, particularly, 
African households where migrant workers would leave their children in the care of a grandmother 
and still send transfers home to help with the expenses of upbringing (Duflo, 2000; Edmonds et aI., 
2003). This outcome undermines the conclusion in Maitra and Ray's study that the pension transfers 
might do more damage than good in alleviating poverty. The interaction term between poverty and 
transfers is negative and significant which indicates that the giver to the poor household might also 
be poor and that the substantial pension income might alleviate the burden of sending home 
remittances - an idea that pensions might assist with the poverty alleviation of remittance senders 
as well. 
The presence of adults in the household impacting negatively on the transfers to children 
further supports this argument as does the increase in transfers for children with a female 
household head. The large positive relationship between the female household head dummy and 
adult female transfer receipt indicates to us a more specific outcome than the general remittance 
support of the unemployed and again indicates that these transfers are linked to the nuclear family 
and the upbringing of children. Additionally, transfers to children increase when there is an 
unemployed adult in the household (perhaps the mother) whereas transfers to adults with 
unemployed adults in the household decrease significantly, another sign of public grants crowding 
out private ones. 
Another significant finding is that black and coloured children receive higher transfer income 
than do white children whilst these same races receive lower transfers for the elderly. An indication 
of the crowding out of pensions by race as well as income. 
We can see that pension and transfer income received by women in the household, regardless of 
the sex of the household head, is spent on items related to the welfare of children which is the 
opposite effect of the spending behaviour of male income receivers. From the last set of equations 
we see a picture of the types of household members who receive transfers and why these transfers 











well as unemployed caregivers to children shows that these remittances would be targeted; be 
received from a household with similar socioeconomic status and therefore most likely be 
conditional. Conditional transfers are held to change behaviour that "leads to desirable outcomes" 
(Hoddinott, 2008). From our 3SLS results we can say that transfers, both public and private, are 
spent differently according to who receives the income. We can therefore reject the hypothesis of 
income pooling on the basis that it matters who receives these incomes as to how they will be 
spent. 
7. Sensitivity checks 
We check the sensitivity of our results to the make-up of variables in our analysis to see if the 
conclusions we arrive at are robust for decisions on variable definitions. 
In the section on data we find that, in the original Maitra and Ray study a number of the parameters 
and definitions were contentious in the sense that they might have been imperfectly included or 
contained bias. Our results for all these checks are presented in appendix 4 except for the race 3SLS 
as they add little. 
Poverty 
These included the poverty variable which seemed fairly high (in both 1993 and 2006 it was pegged 
by Maitra and Ray just under the level of the penSion grants). We keep in mind that South African 
poverty is generally held to be above the two-dollar a day line. As poverty lines as such are fairly 
arbitrary we see if our results bear up under different more traditionally used poverty lines9• 
We find with the dollar-a-day poverty line (dPOV) that 8 out of the 11 budget share equations have 
conflicting signs for male and female transfer income - a more poignant result by far. This result 
does well to impress on us the large impact on conditional grants on behaviour. The signs of the 
pension variables are roughly constant however and only the standard errors have increased in 
some cases. The overall impression of households divided by different spending decisions still holds. 
The 2-dollar a day line (d2POV) decreases our conviction over the spending patterns of transfer 












recipients but not so far as to negate it. 5 out of the 11 budget shares still have conflicting signs but 
notably childcare does not although it can be seen that education expenditures still increase for 
female transfer income. The pension patterns are much the same and support our rejection of the 
unitary household model. 
The percentage of households in poverty by race 
Race 
Black Coloured Indian White Total 
POV 51.38 31.35 10.51 2.9 43.73 
dPOV 19.94 8.5 3.3 0.49 16.42 
d2POV 38.29 22.7 6.31 1.09 32.38 
Adult Equivalence Scales 
Without engaging in a debate regarding the appropriate equivalence scales it would be well to check 
the sensitivity of our results to a more orthodox weighting. Maitra and Ray, as shown in the "Data" 
section of this paper, apply weights to children which are greater than those accorded to adults. We 
choose, in order to ensure that our results are insensitive to changes in our parameter choices, to 
adopt an equivalence scale that is closer to those used for developing countries and suggested in 
Deaton (1997) 
where nc is the symbol for the total number of Children, na the number of adults and no the number 
of elderly present in a household. The economies of scale are set at 0.9. The Again our results are 
subject to increases in the standard errors of the coefficients which render many of them 
insignificant. Our general conclusions hold, however, in that for a few key items we have signs that 
are reversed - for example pension income increases food shares whereas other income decreases 
basic item shares. We find that although the standard errors of our variables are sensitive to these 
weights, our overall picture of different spending behaviour between men and women still hold. 
We have seriously questioned the inclusion of race dummy variables in the 1993 analysis because of 
the divergent income and expenditure options open to non-whites in comparison to whites. The 











whites in the apartheid years as were IIlCorne OptKlnS as occupation choices were limited toolO, The 
differerl.:es in income distributKlns ca n be seen In Maltra and Ray's kernel density ~ot of black and 
non-black income soorces and should have convinced the authors of the systematic differences 
between races, OUr own kernel denSity plots by race (shown below) indicate that the differences in 
income between races may well be explained by dummy variableS for each races as our analysis has 
dl)lle. 
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Unlike Maitra and Ray we find that there is a distributional difference between income with and 
income withoot pensions for black households, ln fact, these differences are similar to nOll-black 
hc;Jsehods, We can see that the kernel density plot for non-black households seems bimodal, at 
least in total income, and therefore examine each race more closely. 
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All races now Show the same shift for the InclUSIOll of penSlO1l income_ rhis result lays to rest some 
cl ow concern atx:oJt inc luding race dummieS In our analysis_ 
In 2006 we WOUld most likety find that income levels, rather than race per say, have a greater 
impact on incorne expenditure options available to households as 1993 levels cl educatil)ll and 
healthcare expend~ure would have been set to some extent. This woold have categoriLed groups 0( 
spenders not only by the level of ther incomes but also by the ir races. In 2006, txJwever, one would 










have played a greater role in spending patterns and levels. This observation should be checked so as 
to convince ourselves that our results are robust. We therefore divide our data into race subsamples 
and run the gender disaggregation regression on each of these. We should note the frequency of 
transfer flows between these races to make sure that we do not encounter a small sample problem. 
Private Transfers by Race 
Black Coloured Indian White 
Transfers to males 3608 398 19 26 
Transfers to females 3980 473 25 42 
Total 13865 2334 293 1631 
When separating our analysis by race we find that we cannot decipher much about the spending 
behaviour of transfer recipients. PenSions, however, produce more stark contrasts between male 
and female receivers than before. We can see that the female headed household spend more on 
basic and child-items than male pension recipients. This outcome points towards different recipients 
spending differently even with unconditional income such as pensions. Coloured and Indian 
households do not have clear-cut behavioural patterns in this data and we cannot generalise to a 
unitary household model nor confirm that their patterns are different from other races. The 
regression analysis for white households indicates that Engel's laws hold however there is no 
convincing evidence of different spending behaviour between the sexes. There are so few cases of 
transfers in non-black households that we make our analysis vulnerable to small sample issues when 
we divide up our analysis (espeCially for Indian households). We therefore conclude that there is 












Working from Maitra and Ray's 2003 income and expenditure model for intra-household bargaining 
we replicate their system of equations in order to establish whether the results of income pooling 
rejection and the crowding out of private transfers by pension income for the poor only - hold in 
2006. We find that private transfers generally differ in how they are spent depending on who they 
are received by. Although this is most likely owing to the conditionality of these transfers on the 
ways they are spent there is enough evidence in the data that expenditure patterns between men 
and women of pension income (an unconditional grant) differ Significantly. We caution policy makers 
in this field about basing decisions on results sensitive to the make-up of the model. We can be 
confident about the general picture shown us by this analysis; namely that it matters who receives 
income as to how it is spent. We have enough evidence to reject the unitary household model on 
the basis of penSion as well as private transfer spending patterns. Grants to women significantly 
favour poverty alleviation of children and are focused on improving access to baSic consumption 
groups such as food. This offers an awkward Criticism of the recent extension of the pension to 
males aged between 60 and 65 years old. Although gender equitable, the SOCial pension has been 
held up as not only an effective means of poverty alleviation for the elderly but also as an effective 
means of combating poverty in other vulnerable groups such as children. 
Additionally, we find that - contrary to Maitra and Ray - the crowding out of transfer income 
by state pensions exists across the board. We offer a rather more positive outcome that could result 
from this substitution of private by public funds. Firstly, it is redistribution to the poor and 
vulnerable. Private funds would most likely flow from poorer individuals to their equally as poor 
extended family. Public grants, on the other hand, are funded through a progressive tax system. 
Secondly, these pension flows are constant so long as the pensioner remains alive allowing 
household to plan on virtually guaranteed income (Case & Deaton, 1998). Lastly, rather than 
entrenching poverty as Maitra and Ray claim, the benefits of poverty alleviation may exist not only 
for pensioners and children as found in Case and Deaton (1998) but also for households sending 
these remittances which may have been threatened by poverty by having to provide for their 
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